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NOTES
FEDERAL VENUE AND SERVICE AND THE FOREIGN
CORPORATION IN DIVERSITY LITIGATION
I
Venue and service of summons have been the traditional determi-
nants of place of trial in the federal system.' Service of summons is the
procedure by which jurisdiction is asserted over the person of the de-
fendant,2 while venue requirements are imposed for the protection of the
litigants against an arbitrary selection of forum.' The narrower of these
two requirements will act as the outer limit on the plaintiff's choice of a
place for the trial. Under the Judicial Code of 1948 a third determinant
has been provided, forum non conveniens, which 'permits the defendant
to seek a transfer of the forum on grounds of inconvenience.4
Since the selection of a forum is the basic first step in all litigation,
the requirements for its selection should be simple and certain allowing
the plaintiff to choose his forum with a minimum of delay. In suits
against non-resident corporations, which make up a large percentage of
diversity litigation,' there has been great confusion on this basic problem
much of which is due to the fact that the courts have historically made use
of fictions to overcome obstacles to suits against foreign corporations.6
The states were the first to solve the problem of acquiring jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations. The peculiar nature of these defendants
made it difficult to subject them to suit. It early developed that a corpora-
tion "must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to an-
other sovereignty."'  Jurisdictional requirements for corporations were
1. "In addition to jurisdiction as a federal court and jurisdiction of the person or of
property, the District Court cannot retain a case against objection if it is not laid in the
proper venue, that is, in the right district." BUNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 114 (5th ed. 1949).
2. Mississippi v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946). Validity of service involves
two questions: how the defendant may be served and where the defendant may be served.
Nickerson v. Warren City Tank & Boiler Co., 223 Fed. 843, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
3. Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cures, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307
(1951).
4. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948).
5. In seventy percent of diversity litigations corporations are parties. Non-resident
corporations are defendants in approximately fifty percent of all diversity litigation.
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Rezision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEM,.
PROB. 216, 243 (1948).
6. Notes, 35 COL. L. REv. 591 (1935); 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 523 (1949).
7. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U.S. 1839).
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thus, at first, clear but very restrictive, for a corporation could only be
sued in its home state. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the
general belief was that foreign corporations were subject only to quasi
in rem proceedings.' As corporations increasingly engaged in activities
outside their state of incorporation, however, it became important to sub-
ject them to suit in these states. The first attempt to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation came in New York in 1835.' The
foreign corporate defendants were finally made amenable to state process
on the basis of their carrying on business activity in the state.'"
An equally difficult problem was the subjection of corporate de-
fendants to federal diversity jurisdiction." Under the Judiciary'Act of
1789 venue in the federal courts was limited to the plaintiff's or de-
fendant's residence; service was valid only if the defendant were present
in the state. 2 At that time, no corporation had a recognized existence
outside its state of incorporation. 3 Therefore, though venue would be
proper at plaintiff's residence, there could be no service upon and thus no
means of acquiring diversity jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 4
In 1875 venue was broadened by statute to include any place at which the
defendant could be served, i.e., wherever he was an inhabititant or could
be found. 5  Ex parte Schollenberger' held that a foreign corporation's
consent to receive state process pursuant to a state statute was also con-
8. For a detailed historical account of jurisdiction of the courts over foreign cor-
poratoins see DODD, AMERIcAN BUsINEss CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 (1954); HENDERSON,
THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AmERICA? CONSTITUTIONAL LAw c.5 (1918).
9. Kane v. Morris Canal & Banking Co. The opinion is set forth in Middlebrooks
v. Springfield Fire Insurance Co., 14 Conn. 301, 303 n.(a) (1841). The attempt was
unsuccessful.
10. Personal jurisdiction of a court over a foreign corporation was at first based
on the fiction of implied consent. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Lafayette
Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1856). Later cases recognized that the
corporation was present and subject to jurisdiction of the court if it was carrying on
business. See Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry
On Business within the Territory, 30 HAv. L. Rxv. 676 (1917).
11. This Note will not analyze the requirement of diversity of citizenship of the
parties for suit in the federal courts. For the development of the fiction that a cor-
poration is a citizen of the state of its creation see McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction,
56 HARv. L. REV. 853, 1090 (1943). For the interesting problem of diversity of citizen-
ship and the multistate corporation see Notes, 31 N.C.L. REv. 211 (1953) ; 14 OHIO ST.
L.J. 106 (1953); 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 220 (1953).
12. 1 STAT. 78 (1789).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. Pomeroy v. New York & N.H.R.R., 19 Fed. Cas. 965, No. 11,261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1857); Day v. Newark India-Rubber Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. 245, No. 3685 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1850).
15. 18 STAT. 470 (1875). Early cases under this Act held that a corporation could
only be sued in the state of incorporation. Hume v. Pittsburg C. & St. L. R. R., 12 Fed.
Cas. 870, No. 6,865 (D.C. D. Ind. 1877); Stillwell v. Empire Fire Ins. Co., 23 Fed. Cas.
90, No. 13,449 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1877).
16. 96 U.S. 369 (1878).
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sent to be "found" in the state for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Later
cases held that, even in the absence of express consent, if the corporation
carried on sufficient activities, it was "found" in the state for federal
jurisdiction purposes." This was the first instance in which federal
diversity jurisdictional requirements were wholly satisfied by a quantum
of corporate business activity.
The advantages of this liberal approach were partially nullified in
1888 by a statute which again restricted venue to the plaintiff's or de-
fendant's residence;"* the word "found" was eliminated as a basis for
venue. Since a corporation's residence was its place of incorporation, 9
its business activity elsewhere would not satisfy federal venue though
such activity would subject a corporation to service at the plaintiff's resi-
dence.2" It was not until 1939, in Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp.," that the Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to sue a corporation
elsewhere than the plaintiff's residence or defendant's state of incorpora-
tion. The Neirbo case, like Schollenberger, held that, if a foreign cor-
poration, pursuant to a state statute, appointed an agent to receive sum-
mons, it waived venue in the federal court of that state." Section
1391 (c), the present provision permitting venue to be laid where a cor-
porate defendant is "doing business," was added in 1948.23 This was
an expansion of the Neirbo rule: Venue was to be determined inde-
.pendently of state service statutes though still to be defined by the con-
cept of corporate activity. The traditional bases of venue, plaintiff's and
defendant's residences, were, preserved in Section 1391 (a)."
There are two federal rules that provide a manner of service on
foreign corporations.2" Rule 4(d) (3), designates the agent upon whom
service may be made but does not indicate where a corporation may be
17. See Merchants' Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry., 13 Fed. 358, 360 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1882).
18. 25 STAT. 433 (1888).
19. Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892).
'20. Two fictions were used to subject the corporation to service in the district of
plaintiff's residence: implied consent [Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1878)] and
the presence theory [Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898)]. See note
10 supra.
21. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
22. Under this doctrine many problems arose as to the scope of the consent and
the engagement in activities in violation of or in the absence of a state statute. See
Comment, 42 ILL. L. REv. 780 (1948).
23. "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
24. "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1948).
25. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 924 (2d ed. 1948).
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served.2" Though the language of this rule intimates that mere physical
presence of an agent may be sufficient basis for service, it has generally
been interpreted as a codification of former practice which required that
corporations must be engaged in business activity." Rule 4(d) (7) per-
26. Service shall be made "[u]pon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common
name, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a manag-
ing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant." FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d) (3).
There is some ambiguity in the phrase "agent authorized by law." It is generally ac-
cepted that "law" means federal law. See 2 MOOE,- FEDERAL PRACTICE 959 n.5. No rigid
rule can be laid down as to who is an agent authorized by law to receive service. It is
obvious that if there is no agency relationship between the defendant corporation and
the person served, no basis for service of process under 4(d) (3) ekists. Rogers v. Arzf,
1 F.R.D. 581 (1941). The basic requirement is that service be made on an agent who
can reasonably be expected to realize the significance of the legal papers and notify the
corporation of the suit. See Operative Plasterers' & Cement Finishers' Int'l Ass'n v'.
Case, 93 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Cohen v. Physical Culture Shoe Co., 28 F. Supp. 679
(S.D. N.Y. 1938). For cases illiustrating the particular agents who may be served see 1
BARON & HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 179 (1950); 9 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRivATE CoRPoRATioNs § 4415 et seq. (Perm. ed. 1931).
27. 4 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PRocEDuRE §§ 965, 975 .(2d ed. 1943) ; Holtzoff, Prac-
tice under the Federal Rules of Cizl Procedure, 20 B.U.L. Rv. 179, 187 (1940). After
the passage of the 1888 act, the majority of courts held that a foreign corporation was
not subject to service within the district of the plaintiff's residence unless it was "found'
there, i.e., "regularly and substantially doing business" there. Noel Construction Co. v.
George W. Smith & Co., 193 Fed. 492, 497 (C.C.D. Md. 1911). See Hoyt v. Ogden Port-
land Cement Co., 185 Fed. 889 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911); Wilkins v. Queen City Savings
Bank & Trust Co., 154 Fed. 173 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907) ; London Machinery Co. v. Ameri-
can Malleable Iron Co., 127 Fed. 1008 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1904); Dinzy v. Illinois Cent. Ry.,
61 Fed. 49 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1894).
A minority of courts took the view that service made on an officer present in the
state on corporate business was valid even though the corporation did not engage in requi-
site activity within the state. These courts held that a corporation, like an individual,
should be subject to service wherever physically present and that the corporation was
present in any state to which it sent its officers to transact business. The requirement of
being "found" was looked upon as a misapplication of the earlier federal statute. Brush
Creek Coal & Mining Co. v. Morgan-Gardner Electric Co., 136 Fed. 505 (C.C.W.D.Mo.
1905); New Haven Pulp & Board Co. v. Downingtown Mfg. Co., 130 Fed. 605 (C.C.
D.Conn. 1904); Houston v. Filler & Stowell Co., 85 Fed. 757 (C.C.N.D.Ill. 1898).
To the present time, however, in order for service to be valid in the federal courts,
the corporation must be engaged in requisite activity within the district. See, e.g., Bank
of America v. Witney Central National Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Lumiere v. Mae
Edna Wilder Inc., 261 U.S. 174 (1923); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibben, 243
U.S. 264 (1917); Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-UR-Self-Systems, Inc., 194 F.2d 422 (2d
Cir. 1951) ; Cannon v. Time, 115 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Dam v. General Electric Co.,
111 F.Supp. 342 (E.D. Wash., 1953); Ott v. Hudnut Sales Co., 107 F.Supp. 919 (D.
Colo. 1952); Schenstrom v. Continental Machines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1947);
Rendleman v. Niagara Sprayer Co., 16F.2d 122 (E.D. Ill. 1925).
Four cases which were removed from the state court to the federal courts are most
often cited as authority for the proposition that a corporation can only be served in the
federal courts if the corporations engage in requisite activity. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215
U.S. 437 (1910) ; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903) ; Goldey v.
Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
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mits service to be made in the manner prescribed by the law of the state
in which the federal court sits." The state statutes reached through this
rule not only describe methods of service but also provide the basis of a
state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations." Thus a federal notice
provision is fortuitously tied to the state basis of jurisdiction-the terri-
torial sovereignty of the state.
The requisite activity concept"0 is thus, as in the states, the basis of
federal jurisdictional requirements. Having developed concurrently
over a long period, the various federal and state courts' interpretations of
requisite activity vary, presently, from some conservative state concepts
requiring sizeable business activity, 1 to the federal concept of minimal
business contacts, 2 to the liberal state concept of a single act within the
jurisdiction." This variance raises complicated due process and choice of
law problems, and, to indicate the interaction of these trial determinants, it
is necessary to examine them in specific fact situations.
II
No serious problems of service or venue arise if the plaintiff sues a
28. "[Ilt is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the manner
prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by the law
of the state in which the service is made. . . ." FED. R. Civ. PA(d) (7).
The concept of using state procedure in the federal courts is an old one. A 1789
statute (1 STAT. 93) provided that forms of writs and execution and modes of processes
in a suit at common law in the federal courts be the same as their respective states. Con-
formity to state practice was continued by the Process Act of 1828 (4 STAT. 278) and the
Conformity Act of 1872 (17 STAT. 196). The purpose of the Conformity Act was to
bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in federal and state courts of the same
locality; lawyers would only have to learn one procedure.
One commentator states: "Unfortunately, the Conformity Act of 1872 has not
operated wholly in the manner expected. While intended to simplify the situation, it
has resulted in considerable confusion in Federal practice, owing to the exceptions and
limitations, which decisions of the Supreme Court have read into the Act." Warren,
Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv. 546, 564 (1930). One of the limi-
tations some courts followed was that all questions of jurisdiction were determined
exclusively by federal law. See McNeal-Edwards Co. v. Frank L. Young Co., 42 F2d
362 (1st Cir. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 283 U.S. 398 (1931) ; 4 CYCLOPEDIA OF FED-
ERAL PROCEDURE § 974; Tolman, The Origin of the Conformity Idea, Its Development,
the Failure of the E.xperiment, the Evils Which Resulted Therefrom and the Cure for
those Evils, 23 A.B.A.J. 971 (1937).
29. See notes 52, 53 infra.
30. Requisite activity is used in this Note to represent the concept that a court will
attach legal consequences to a quantum of business activity. This word is used rather
than ones which have been used by the courts in their various fictions.
31. See note 62 infra.
32. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This leading case
established the test that the due process clause is satisfied if the corporation's ties with
the state, "make it reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice" that the corporation be subject to the state's jurisdiction.
33. Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F.Supp. 654 (D.Md. 1950);
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) ; Comment,
37 CORNELL L.Q. 458 (1952).
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corporation in the federal district court sitting in a state where the cor-
poration is incorporated or licensed to do business. This is obviously
a permissible place of trial." Suppose, however, that the plaintiff sues
a foreign corporation in the district court sitting at the plaintiff's resi-
dence. Since venue is correct at the plaintiff's residence under Section
1391 (a), the only problem should be one of service. In two recent cases
of this type, however, the courts looked to the venue requirement of Sec-
tion 1391 (c), held that the defendants were not "doing business," and
dismissed the suits."5 One possible explanation for this result is that the
courts did not believe Section 1391 (a) applied where corporations were
defendants. Another possibility is that the courts regarded corporate
activity necessary for service and then mistakenly drew upon the require-
ment of "doing business" in the federal venue statute instead of looking
to state service statutes. When the plaintiff sues at his own residence,
however, it is not the venue requirement which should limit his choice
of forum; the limitation in such cases should be the service requirement.
The federal rules merely prescribe the manner of service. If service
were made under a state statute, pursuant to 4(d) (7), state decisions
would determine the validity of the manner of service ;" while if service
were made as provided in 4(d) (3), federal law would control.3" The
corporation must be engaged in requisite activity to be subject to service
under either of these provisions, and the question arises whether state or
federal law shall determine the quantum of activity required.
34. Although, to satisfy venue under § 1391 (c), the corporation must be doing busi-
ness in the particular district rather than the state, if the corporation is incorporated or
licensed in the state, venue is valid in any district within the state. See Note, 1 SYRAcUSE
L. REv. 117, 120 p.23 (1949). Under the former venue statute, a corporation was a resi-
dent of the state in which it was incorporated, and, where the state of incorporation was
divided into several districts, then the corporation was considered as resident -of the
district where its official residence was designated by charter or law or in the district
where its principal headquarters was maintained. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcCE 2123.
If a corporation was "doing business" and the state was composed of several federal
districts, venue would be proper only in the district in which the defendant corporation
was "doing business" although service would be valid anywhere within the state under
Federal Rule 4(f). See Neset v. Christensen, 92 F.Supp. 78, 83 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
If a corporation is not incorporated or licensed in the state where suit is brought
but is merely engaged in activities, very difficult problems arise whether or not such
activities satisfy the requirement of "doing business" within the meaning of 1391(c)
and the requsite activities necessary for service under 4(d) (3) and 4(d) (7). These
problems are discussed at p. 334 infra.
35. Harrison v. Robb Mfg. Co., 110 F.Supp. 848 (D.Md. 1953); Goldstein v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 93 F.Supp. 671 (W.D. N.Y. 1950).
36. Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949);
Allegue v. Gulf & South American S. S. Co., 103 F.Supp. 34 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) ; Moore v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F.Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
37. Neset v. Christensen, 92 F.Supp. 78 (E.D. N.Y. 1950); Hartsock v. Commodity
Credit Corp., 10 F.R.D. 181 (S.D. Iowa 1950) ; Western Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson
Bros. & Co., 42 F.Supp. 1007 (S.D. Iowa 1941).
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It is contended by some writers that the very reference to state
statutes in 4(d) (7) forces federal courts to state decisions defining
requisite activity. 8 If state statutes are to govern the manner of service
in the federal courts, then state law should also define what activities
are required to subject the corporation to service. Pidson v. American
Rolling Mill Co.,"9 and many cases following,4" have developed a two-step
analysis to be used when a foreign corporation is served under 4(d) (7).
First, the state law and decisions must be examined to determine if the
corporation's activities are sufficient to make it amenable to state service.
If the state permits service, the next consideration41 is whether or not
such service is consistent with the due process or commerce clauses of
the Federal Constitution." This is a federal question and the state rul-
ings are not controlling. If a state statute sets a standard below the con-
stitutional minimum, the act is invalid; and, for all practical purposes,
there is no state statute. Rule 4(d) (7) would be of no assistance to the
plaintiff.3
The use of state law to define requisite activity in cases involving
4(d) (7) and 4(d) (3) can also be explained on the basis of Erie v. Tomp-
38. See Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co., 111 F.Supp. 92, 98, 102 (D. N.J. 1954) ;
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 959 (1953) ; Bar-
rett, Venue and Serzvice of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7
VAND. L. REv. 608, 618 (1954).
39. 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
40. Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 947 (1950); Schmickler v. Petersime Incubator Co., 177 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.
1949); Kelley v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 170 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 939 (1949) ; Reko v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n, 14 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1953) ; Nichols
v. Cowles Mag. Inc., 103 F.Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 1952) ; Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg.
Co., 99 F.Supp. 237 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Wadell v. Green Textile Associates Inc., 92
F.Supp. 738 (D.Mass. 1950); Read v. Corbitt Co., 10 F.R.D. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1950);
Barnhart v John B. Rogers Producing Co., 9 F.R.D. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Fritchey v.
Summar, 86 F.Supp. 391 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Isenberg v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 82
F.Supp. 927 (D. Mass. 1949).
Federal courts not specifically citing 4(d) (7) have used state law to determine the
activity necessary when service is made under state law. Mississippi Wood Preserving
Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Albritton v. General Factors Corp., 201
F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1953) ; London's Inc. v. Mack Shirt Corp., 114 F.Supp. 883 (D. Mass.
1953) ; Cole v. Stonhard Co., 12 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. N.Y. 1952).
41. At times there is a "cart-before-the-horse" consideration and the court reverses
the order in considering these two questions. Insurance Co. of North America v. Lone
Star Package Car Co., 107 F.Supp. 645 (S.D. Tex. 1952), rev'd on other grounds sub.
nora. Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
42. For a discussion of this second step see Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 99
F.Supp. 237 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Wadell v. Green Textile Associates Inc., 92 F.Supp.
738 (D. Mass. 1950).
43. "The principal limitation upon the application of a state statute under Rule
4(d) (7) is the constitutionality of the statute." McWhorter v. Anchor Serum Co., 72
F.Supp. 437, 439 (W.D. Ark. 1947). See Barnhart v. John B. Rogers Producing Co.,
9 F.R.D. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1950); HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 38; 2 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 942.
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kins." Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Erie v. Tomp-
kins doctrine were formulated in 1938; the rules substituted federal uni-
formity for state conformity in the area of procedure, while the Erie de-
cision required state conformity instead of federal uniformity in matters
of substantive law.45 In 1945 the Guaranty Trust case48 discarded the
procedure-substance dichotomy and established the rule that state law
should be applied in cases in which disregard of such law would sub-
stantially affect the outcome." Using this extended Erie rationale three
federal courts recently held that, since their jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship, state law must be applied to determine the
quantum of activity necessary for service.4" Notwithstanding these ex-
pansions of Erie v. Tompkins, some federal courts have held that state
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45. Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rides, 3
VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950).
46. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
47. This is based on the theory that diversity of citizenship should not lead to a
substantially different result in state and federal courts within the same geographical
area. Recent cases have pushed this extended version of the Erie doctrine to rules of
procedure. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) ; Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
Whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the parties does affect the result of
litigation. See Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey, and Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNrELLL.Q. 494,
511 (1949). The Court in an early case said, "The state could not prescribe the qualifi-
cations of suitors in the courts of the United States, and could not deprive of their
privileges those who were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States
to resort to the Federal courts for the enforcement of a valid contract." David Lupton's
Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489, 500 (1912). In Angel v. Bulling-
ton, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947), however, the Court declared that cases such as Litpton's
Sons Co. were obsolete in light of Erie v. Tompkins. "[The Erie] decision drastically
limited the power of federal district courts to entertain suits in diversity cases that could
not be brought in the respective State courts or were barred by defenses controlling in
State courts."
48. Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Canvas Fab-
ricators Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Allentown
Record Co. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F.Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1951); cf. Iser v. Brockway,
25 F.Supp. 221 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
In the three cases, neither 4(d) (3), 4(d) (7), nor state statutes were cited. The
courts spoke in terms of Erie v. Tompkins as they applied state law to determine if the
defendants were engaged in sufficient activity to be amenable to service. The Pidson
case, however, was cited as authority for applying state law. Were these decisions (that
state law be applied) restricted to cases where service is under a state statute or in all
diversity cases because of Erie? See Judge Bigg's concurring opinion in Partin v. Mi-
chals Art Bronze Co., supra at 545; 102 U. oF PA. L. REv. 415 (1954). Judge Biggs does
not believe that Erie governs this area, but he has not clarified his position as to whether
or not state law should govern through Rule 4(d) (7) because of the wording of that rule.
Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153 n.4 (5th Cir. 1954),
interpreted the Partin case and Pidson case as holding that it was the Erie rule that re-
quired the use of state law to determine whether a foreign corporation is subject to
service. The court in the Lone Star case held that, since its jurisdiction was based on a
federal question, Erie v. Tompkins and state law were not applicable. See discussion
p. 333 in-fra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
decisions are not controlling in this matter. 9 Judge Biggs of the Third
Circuit has maintained that the right of a citizen to sue a citizen of another
state in a federal court is granted by the Constitution, and jurisdiction so
conferred upon the national courts should not be impaired by a state
statute or decision." Accepting this view, when service is made under
either of the applicable federal rules, then federal law should determine
whether the corporation is engaged in sufficient activity to be amenable
to suit. Then the nanner of service should be determined with state law
controlling under 4(d) (7) and the federal law under 4(d) (3).1 This
approach is based on the assumption that the requisite activity test can be
separated from questions of manner of service. If the state legislature
has separated these two requirements," it is easy for federal courts to
treat them separately; but, if the two are fused in one statute, 3 it seems
strained to rule that federal law should determine one half a state statute
and state law the other half.5 '
49. "Whether a foreign corporation or other business entity is doing business in a
state is a matter of general, not local, law." 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 969. Wood-
workers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1951) ; French v. Gibbs Corp., 189
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951) ; General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 122 F.Supp.
797 (S.D. N.Y. 1954) ; Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co., 111 F.Supp. 92 (D. N.J. 1953)
(court noted that the same result would be reached under state law) ; Pike v. N.E.
Greyhound Lines, 93 F.Supp. 669 (D. Mass. 1950) (court noted that the same result
would be reached under state law); Myers Motors v. Kaiser-Fraser Sales Corp., 80
F.Supp. 18 (D. Minn. 1948); Bergold v. Commercial National Underwriters, Inc., 61
F.Supp. 639 (D. Kan. 1945) ; Carby v. Greco, 31 F.Supp. 251 (W.D. Ky. 1940) ; Hedrick
v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939). Cf. McCoy v. Siler, 205
F.2d 498, 501 (3d Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953). See
Lacey, Solicitation as Doing Business-A Review of New York and Federal Cases, 18
FORD. L. Rv. 204, 211, n.30 (1949).
Perhaps this is the sounder view of the effect of Erie v. Tompkins in federal pro-
cedure in light of Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). The
enabling clause of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides that the rules shall not modify
the substantive rights of the litigants. The court admitted that an alteration in the rules
of service affects the right of litigants but pointed out that such a change does not modify
the rules of decision by which the court will decide the parties' rights but relates merely to
the manner by which a right to recover is enforced. "In this sense the rule is a rule of
procedure and not of substantive right. . . ." Id. at 446. Guaranty Trust case was cited
as authority for this distinction. See discussion p. 331 supra; HART & WECHSLER, op.
cit. supra note 38, at 960. Cf. McCoy v. Siler, supra.
50. Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1953) (con-
curring opinion). For a refutation of this argument see 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 415, 417
(1954).
51. See notes 36 and 37 supra.
52. Some states have partially done this by a statutory provision listing agents who
may be served, and the courts have stipulated that the corporation must carry on a quan-
tum of activity to be amenable to service. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.150 (Vernon
1949) ; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT. § 229.
53. Some statutes provide that a foreign corporation doing business shall be deemed
to appoint a state officer as its agent upon whom service may be made. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-340 (1947); MASS. ANN. LAWS c.181, § 3A (1933).
54. Compare Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F.Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951),
with Read v. Corbitt Co., 10 F.R.D. 125 (E.D. Pa .1950).
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State law can thus be reached either through a particular interpreta-
tion of 4(d) (7) or through an application of the Erie rule. 5 Should
state decisions determine requisite activity because of the wording of
4(d) (7), they would be applied whether federal jurisdiction were based
on diversity of citizenship or federal question. If state interpretations
govern as a result of the Erie doctrine, they would apply only in diversity
cases.Y0
If state law defines requisite activity, then the due process clause
which limits service in the state also limits service in the federal courts.
The defendant is thus protected from being sued in an unreasonable
forum. Should federal law govern, it is necessary to inquire what due
process limitations are imposed on federal courts. Service on corporate
agents present within the district would seem to satisfy Fifth Amendment
requirements of notice. Beyond this, federal courts have imposed upon
themselves, as upon the states, the limitation that corporations must be
engaged in requisite activity in order to be subject to service." The due
process limitation on the Federal Government, unlike that on the states,
is not based on territorial sovereignty." The powers of the federal courts
are not coextensive with the territorial limits of the district, for the
55. The problems of service in a case removed to a federal court are very similar to
those arising in a case involving 4(d) (7). As under Rule 4(d) (7), service in a case
removed to a federal district court is based on state statutes. By removal a defendant
does not lose his right to challenge the service in the state court. Bomze v. Nardis
Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
just as under Rule 4(d) (7) some courts in removal cases have used the two-step
analysis. See Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954); Rosenthal v.
Frankfort Distillers Corp., 193 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Roark v. American Distilling
Co., 97 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Forsgren v. Gillioz, 110 F.Supp. 647 (W.D. Ark. 1953) ;
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F.Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950); Doyle v.
Southern Pacific Co., 87 F.Supp. 974 (E.D. Mo. 1949). Again this result can be ra-
tionalized on the theory that, since service is based on state law, it should be defined by
state law. See note 41 supra. One court held that it was the Erie doctrine that required
state law to be followed in a removal case. Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 F.Supp.
946 (S.D. Cal. 1951). See Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d
147, 153 (5th Cir. 1954).
Other cases have held that the question of service in cases removed to the federal
courts is determined by reference to federal law and not state statutes or decisions.
Woodard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 59 F.Supp. 452 (W.D. La. 1945) ; Hinchcliffe Motors,
Inc. v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 30 F.Supp. 580 (D. Mass. 1939).
56. Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
57. See note 27 supra. In a case involving service under the District of Columbia
Code the court stated that, if Congress passed a statute allowing service on an agent of
the corporation not doing business in the district, this would not be an undue burden on
interstate commerce because Congress has the right to regulate such commerce; but
it would be open to inquiry whether it violated due process. Chase Bag Co. v. Munson
Steamship Line, 295 Fed. 990, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
58. Note, 35 COL. L. REv. 591, 598 (1935).
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Federal Government can provide for nationwide service;" but, as in the
states, the due process limitation on the federal courts is based on fairness,
convenience, and reasonableness of the suit in a particular forum."0 Al-
though the International Shoe case sets out the Fourteenth Amendment
due process limit on the states, federal courts have adopted this test as
applicable to cases governed by the Fifth Amendment.61
Under either state or federal definition of requisite activity, there-
fore, the defendant is protected from an inconvenient forum through
the due process limitation. Although the state definitions of requisite
activity cannot be broader than the constitutional limit, they may be nar-
rower.62 It is the resulting variance that makes the choice of law critical.
If the federal courts in diversity cases are to follow state definitions of
requisite activity, they are tied to the state's jurisdictional concepts.
Federal courts, adhering to their respective state's decisions, may have
broad service powers or may follow more rigorous concepts of requisite
activity for service.
When the plaintiff sues in the state in which he resides, he is thus
restrained only by the requirements of service. If the plaintiff wishes
to sue a corporation in a federal district court located in State X of which
he is a non-resident and which is not where the corporation is incorporated
or licensed to do business, complex problems of both venue and service
arise. The narrower of the two requirements will limit the plaintiff's
choice of forum. The service problems are the same as when the plaintiff
sues in his own state, but there is an added problem of venue since he must
also establish that the corporation is "doing business" under Section
1391 (c). Because the venue provision is based on requisite activity and
is imposed to protect the defendant from an unreasonable forum, it co-
incidently satisfies due process. Since both service and venue depend on
59. 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1951) (Clayton Act) ; 48 STAT. 86 (1933),
as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1951) (Securities Act) ; 53 STAT.
1175 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv(b) (1951) (Trust Indenture Act).
In diversity litigation when the action is brought at the plaintiff's residence, though
venue is correct, the service requirement must still be satisfied. The opposite situation
exists where statutes provide special venue and service provisions for certain causes of
action. Though service is made nationwide, the plaintiff's choice of forum is then
limited by the venue provision. Could Congress constitutionally provide that there be no
venue restriction on the plaintiff's choice of forum?
60. See Note, 35 CoL. L. REv. 591, 599 (1935) ; Cf. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566 (E.D. Ky. 1922).
61. Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1951).
62. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (Its Cir. 1948); Charles
Keeshin, Inc. v. Gordon Johnson Co., 109 F.Supp. 939, 942 (W.D. Ark. 1952) ; Doyle v.
Southern Pacific R.R., 87 F.Supp. 974, 976 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
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some form of requisite activity, these concepts can easily be confused.6"
Are the definitions of requisite activity (for service) and "doing business"
(venue) the same? Some courts have held that the satisfaction of one
requirement also satisfies the other.64
The federal rules do not expressly define the limits of requisite
activity, and this is therefore a dynamic concept which can change with
the state statute and with the requirements of due process. Section
1391 (c) expressly provides that the "doing business" test must be satis-
fied in order for venue to be proper. It may be asked whether the defini-
tion of "doing business" is also a dynamic concept or whether Congres-
sional action would be necessary to expand its definition to the broadest
limits of'requisite activity?
It has been held that the single act of causing one of a corporation's
motor vehicles to be driven through the state would not constitute "doing
business" within the meaning of Section 1391 (c)." 5 Sporadic or occa-
sional dealings fall short of the requisite activity for federal venue pur-
poses," while, on the other hand, the single acts of operating a vehicle,"
owning property, 8 entering a contract, or committing a tort in a state69
have been held to be sufficient activity under 4(d) (7) to subject the
corporation to service for both state and federal diversity purposes. Thus,
63. See Polizzi v. Cowles Mag. Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953), reversing, 197 F.2d 74
(5th Cir. 1952) ; 1 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, op. cit. supra note 26, § 71.
In Ronson Art Metal Works Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow Inc., 104 F.Supp. 716 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952), questions of both venue and service arose. The court recognized the dif-
ferent ways in which the concept of requisite activity had been used. However in dis-
cussing what corporate activity was sufficient to constitute doing business for proper
venue under 1391(c), the court used language typical of a discussion of service and cited
cases involving service.
64. Lehn & Fink Products Corp. v. Milner Products Corp., 117 F.Supp. 320, 322
(S.D. N.Y. 1953); Ronson Art Metal Works Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow Inc., 104 F.Supp.
716, 724 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F.Supp. 375, 382
(E.D. Pa. 1951).
Under the Clayton Act [38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1951)] and the Se-
curities Act [48 STAT. 86 (1933), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 77(v)
(1951)] the cases have held that the quantum of business necessary to support venue
("transact business") is less than the quantum of business necessary to sustain service of
process ("found"). Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1927) ; Noerr Motor Freight Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 113 F.Supp.
737 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 111 F.Supp. 491 (W.D.
Okla. 1953) ; Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 96 F.Supp. 3 (S.D. N.Y. 1951);
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Wimer, 75 F.Supp. 955 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
65. Martin v. Fischback Trucking Co., 183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950).
66. In Martin v. Fischback Trucking Co., mtpra note 65, Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930), a case concerning service was cited as authority
for this statement. See Olympic Radio & Television, Inc. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 85
F.Supp. 579 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
67. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
68. Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. Dist. & Co. 61 (1938).
69. See note 33 supra.
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if the plaintiff sues on a cause of action arising out of an automobile
accident in the district court of State X, service would be valid but venue
requirements would not be met." Here venue is the stricter of the two
requirements and restrains the plaintiff's choice of forum. In these situa-
tions there is a gap between the state and the federal court's jurisdictional
powers. The plaintiff could sue the corporation in a state court; service
and venue would be proper, but a federal court would lack venue and
could not retain the case."' In diversity litigation the effect of Erie v.
Tompkins doctrine has been to make the federal courts as much like the
courts of the state in which they are located as possible. Since, under this
doctrine, a federal court may not take cases a state court would not hear,"2
should not an attempt be made to close the gap created by restricted venue
and hold that a federal court should hear all cases heard by a state court?
The effect of the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine on the venue provisions
has not been considered in the cases. Under the Neirbo doctrine the de-
fendant waived venue in the federal courts by appointing an agent for
receipt of state process. The applicable state law defined the extent of
the waiver, and, as a result, state law defined federal venue."3 Although
International Skoe established requisite activity as a basis for service, re-
cent cases have applied its doctrine as a federal test for defining doing
business within the meaning of Section 1391 (c)." Since venue require-
ments are designed to protect the parties from inconvenience, it may be
70. Since, under the Judicial Code of 1948, venue is a waivable defect, Professor
Moore believes that the Neirbo rule is still in reserve. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 2136.
See McCauley, Recent Developments in Federal Venue in Diversity Cases, 13 GA. B.J.
419, 429 (1951). Professor Moore contends that, if the state had a non-resident motorist
statute, venue would be proper under the Neirbo doctrine rather than 1391 (c). Falter v.
Southwest Wheel Co., 109 F.Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953). In Olberding v. Illinois Cen-
tral R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), a corporation sued an individual, and the court held that
the implied appointment of an agent would not be a waiver of venue. The court held
that this decision was consistent with the Neirbo doctrine. Perhaps the Olberding case
points out the necessity of establishing a new basis of venue-where the cause of action
arose. Barrett, supra note 38, at 628. Interesting questions could have been raised in
the Olberding case: Does 1391(c) apply to corporate plaintiffs? Was the Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad doing business in Kentucky within the definition of 1391(c)? If so, it
could have been argued that 1391 (c) applied to corporate plaintiffs, and that, therefore,
venue was correct since the plaintiff was suing in his own residence. See Note, 28 IND.
L.J. 256 (1953).
71. The plaintiff could sue in the state court, and the defendant might then re-
move to tle federal court. Removal jurisdiction of the federal court is thus greater than
original jurisdiction in this type of case. See 42 ILL. B.J. 382 (1954).
72. See note 47 supra.
73. Carlisle v. Kelly Pile & Foundation Corp., 175 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1949) ; North
Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1942).
74. Glick v. Empire Box Corp., 119 F.Supp. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1954) ; Cooke v. Kilgore
Mfg. Co., 105 F.Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Ronson Art Metal Works Inc. v. Brown
& Bigelow Inc., 104 F.Supp. 716 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) ; Goldstein v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.,
93 F.Supp. 671 (W.D. N.Y 1950).
consistent to apply this "fair and substantial justice" test."5 This general
application of Internatioial Shoe furnishes a uniform federal test of do-
ing business for venue purposes."M
Whether or not the federal courts of a state, of which the plaintiff
is not resident and in which the corporate defendant is not licensed to
do business or incorporated, will entertain the plaintiff's suit thus in-
volves all the complicated problems of venue and service and depends on
which of the different possible combinations of these conflicting methods
of defining requisite activity and "doing business" is used. If Section
1391 (c) is given a uniform federal interpretation based on International
Shoe, and service under both federal rules is made to depend on state law,
then, although venue may be correct and due process satisfied, there may
be no means of service because the state may demand more extensive
activity than is required by due process. If Section 1391 (c) is given a
uniform federal interpretation, and the requisite activity required for
service under 4(d) (3) is based on federal law while service under
4(d) (7) is made dependent on state law because of the wording of that
rule, then there is a method of service wherever venue is proper. Due
process would be the outer limits on the plaintiff's choice of forum. When
4(d) (3) is used, a uniform federal procedure would be invoked; and,
when 4(d) (7) is used, there would be conformity with the state. If
Section 1391 (c), Rules 4(d) (3) and 4(d) (7) are to depend on state law,
there will be complete conformity to the state courts but no uniformity
among the federal courts. On the other hand, if venue and service are
defined by federal law, there will be no conformity to state courts; but
there will be uniformity among the federal courts.
It is evident that the venue, doing business test, and the service,
requisite activity test, are ultimately defined by International Shoe. The
rule of International Shoe is conceptually based on fairness, reasonable-
ness, and convenience so that venue and service become tests to determine
75. But see Olympic Radio & Television v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 85 F.Supp. 579
(E.D. N.Y. 1949) where the use of Internatioial Shoe is questioned.
In Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 86 F.Supp.
13 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), 1391(c), forum non conveniens [28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948)] and
the provision for transfer because of improper venue [28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1948)] were
involved. It is very difficult to tell on which of the three-provisions the court based its
holding. The court may have transferred the case because convenience, an essential ele-
ment of the "doing business" test under 1391 (c), was lacking. Or, if venue was proper
because the defendant engaged in sufficient activity to constitute "doing business", the
court may have transferred the case on the ground that the forum was inconvenient under
tests of forum non conveniens. The court did say that the defendant's activities brought
it within the literal meaning of the venue statute. Id. at 16.
76. This application of International Shoe supports Professor Barrett's statement
that there is a uniform federal interpretation of doing business for venue purposes. Bar-
rett, supra note 38, at 619.
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a convenient forum. Once the forum is determined the defendant can
still move to transfer under forum non conveniens." This gives the
defendant a second opportunity to attack the inconvenience of the forum,
and in this context forum non conveniens may be a dilatory tactic."' Be-
cause of Erie v. Tompkins it is uncertain whether a defendant may take
advantage of forum non conveniens in diversity litigation."9  Since the
three determinants act together in affixing proper place of trial, applica-
tion of the Erie doctrine is possible as to service, venue, and forum non
conveniens. If the Erie policy is to limit the federal court to the jurisdic-
tional powers of the state court, then state law should be applied to all
three determinants. Should state law control service and forum non
conveniens, it is inconsistent to use a uniform federal test to govern
venue alone. Since consistent usage of the same body of law is neces-
sary for a rational determination of a forum, the present conditions
demand a resolution of the affect of the Erie doctrine.
III
Because of the expansion of the service and venue provisions and
the added complication of the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine, the parties spend
much time litigating the question of the proper forum without reaching
the merits of the case. The many problems arising as to service and
venue have not been settled by the cases. The courts have disagreed on
the application of Erie v. Tompkins, and even writers suggesting reforms
have been unable to agree as to the scope of the doctrine.
If jurisdiction is a matter of procedure under Erie v. Tompkins,
then federal law should govern our present venue-process scheme. Some
courts have used a federal definition of requisite activity for Section
1391 (c) and Rule 4(d) (3) under the theory of Erie v. Tompkins, and
a state definition of 4(d) (7) under the theory that state decisions should
be employed to construe state statues.8" To make this interpretation of
our present system more workable, the definition of doing business under
Section 1391 (c) should be extended to include a single act in order that
there will be no jurisdictional gap between the federal and the more
liberal of state courts.8 '
77. See note 4 supra.
78. See Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow, Inc., 104 F.Supp. 716,
724 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
79. See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REv. 380, 398
(1947).
80. Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co., 111 F.Supp. 92 (D. N.J. 1953).
81. It is questionable whether, under the present statutory language, this extension
is possible. See discussion p. 335 supra.
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If it is desirable that federal jurisdiction be determined by federal
law, perhaps all reference to state law should be eliminated. The interests
of the federal and state governments in broadening jurisdiction are not
the same. The states have a more provincial interest; they expand their
jurisdiction to protect their own residents. The Federal Government, on
the other hand, is not solely interested in the convenience of the citizen of
the state in which the district court sits. It must establish rules of pro-
cedure which will provide convenience and fairness to citizens of a nation
over 3000 miles wide and 2000 miles long.
Should 4(d) (7) be eliminated, attention may then be turned to
possible expansion of 4(d) (3) to include methods of service allowed
under existing state laws. If due process is the only limitation and a
single act by a corporation as a basis for service would satisfy due process,
it would seem that a corporation could be served under 4(d) (3) if there
were an agent to receive summons. State statutes (reached by 4(d) (7))
allow substitute service on an officer of the state, but, under present
Rule 4(d) (3), only an agent of the corporation or one authorized by law
can be served. Thus if an agent of the corporation cannot be found in
the state, as is most likely in single tort or contract cases, 4(d) (3), unlike
4(d) (7), would not provide a method of service. Congress would have
to enact a statute to provide a federal officer with authority to receive
service for the corporation.
If 4(d) (7) is retained and federal law is used to determine the
requisite activity requirement, the disadvantage of tying federal courts to
state jurisdictional concepts would be eliminated, yet the advantage of
giving the federal courts access to the state's broad methods of service
under 4(d) (7) would be retained. Of course, the soundness of inter-
preting state statutes by federal law may be questioned. 2
If the position is adopted that a uniform federal interpretation should
be employed, one suggestion with far reaching implications is the com-
plete abandonment of Erie v. Tompkins with a return to Swift v. Tyson.s"
Presently, a weakness of the federal system is highlighted by encourag-
ing forty-eight variations of substantive and procedural law."' Another
approach is Professor Barrett's recent suggestion of an overall revision
of the present rules based on trial convenience." Uniform and complete
federal provisions would govern place of trial; all references to state
82. See discussion p. 332 supra.
83. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
84. Keeffe, supra note 47, at 506.
85. Barrett, supra note 38, at 630, 635.
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practice would be eliminated." This suggestion is a complete departure
from present procedure and is feasible only if the role of Erie v. Tompkins
is abandoned or restricted in application in this area.
The trend has been, however, through an extension of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, to let state law encroach on federal procedure,"7 and the impact of this
interpretation is to destroy the advantages of diversity jurisdiction since
the federal courts in effect become state courts. Present cases have used
state law to define service and forum non conveniens. The cases have
not applied state law to Section 1391 (c), and, even if the courts were to
attempt to cure this inconsistency, an applicable state definition would be
hard to find. Just as it is questionable to define state statutes by federal
law, it may be unsound to interpret federal statutes by state law. Federal
venue and forum non conveniens statutes were developed as a part of an
integrated federal scheme, and as such they are not easily adaptable to
state interpretations.
If the present direction of Erie v. Tompkins is to be accepted,88 fed-
eral statutes are out-dated and should be replaced with ones permitting a
federal court to take jurisdiction in a diversity case only where the re-
spective state courts have such power. On the theory that procedure and
substance cannot be separated, a more sweeping revision, suggested by the
late Bernard Gavit,"9 is to compel the federal courts in diversity litigation
to conform completely not only to state jurisdictional requirements but
to all matters of state procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would be retained only for federal civil action, and the federal courts
would continue to be a model for states which wished to modernize their
practice and procedure. Whether federal or state law determines federal
jurisdiction the current situation demands reform, and before reforms
can be instituted the role of Erie v. Tompkins must be resolved.
86. For the suggestion that Congress or the Supreme Court should provide a uni-
form formula for the determination of doing business see 102 U. oF PA. L. RFv. 415, 418
(1954).
87. See discussion p. 331 supra.
88. Perhaps this expansion should be rejected with a return to the traditional dis-
tinction between substance and procedure. The Federal Rules would be looked upon as
procedural.
89. Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1949). See
also Merrigan, supra note 45, at 727.
